Microsoft Exchange and Remote Desktop Services Specialists


Microsoft Exchange Server and
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Real Time Blacklisting

For some email administrators Blacklists are the greatest weapon against spam. It cannot be denied that they can have a significant effect on the amount of email that your server has to process, and they do meet the primary objective of spam detection - dealing with the email at the point of delivery, therefore  reducing back scatter. They are also free, and once setup require little to no maintenance by the administrator.

However personally I dislike blacklists. I don't like the idea of someone else (either human or computer) deciding on what email I should receive, based on lists and reports that I have no control over.
Furthermore, from a business perspective, using a blacklist may cause potential clients to be rejected, as one of my specialism's is the cleanup of servers that have been abused and are likely to be blacklisted.

However, if I could blacklist IP addresses that I know are trying to send spam to me, in real time, where I have complete control over all aspects of the filter, then that could be something of use. A new feature in Vamsoft ORF has introduced exactly that, and has actually got to the point where I have turned off the antispam features in Exchange.

I have written about Vamsoft ORF before, using it for Greylisting ( and as part of an SMTP gateway configuration (

With the latest version at the time of writing, 4.3, they have introduced a feature called Honey Pot. The simple way that this works is to block IP addresses that attempt to send email to addresses in the Honey Pot list.
In the Vamsoft setup guide it gives you some ideas on how to publish the honey pot addresses, however I found that I didn't need to publish anything.
Going through logs on my backup SMTP gateway, which does recipient validation through Vamsoft rather than Exchange, I noticed that the same non-valid addresses were being used time and time again. These were addresses that I had NEVER used, would never be likely to.

IMPORTANT: The use of addresses that have never been used is the key here. Adding addresses that were in use will provide you with false positives, because that could be legitimate email. If you decide to follow this practise then ensure that you only use addresses that have NEVER been used.

Therefore what I did was turn off recipient validation on my primary SMTP point of entry and configured  that function to be done by Vamsoft ORF. This allowed me to see the addresses that were being sent to on that server as well. I was then able to compile a list to use as my honey pot.
I review the logs frequently to see if new email addresses are being tried, which can be added to the list of honey pot addresses.

This means I am using three tests for spam - recipient validation (which should be something that every site does) greylisting, and honey pot.

The effect was significant. I have been using this setup for a number of weeks and the amount of spam I am seeing in my mailbox or caught by IMF (so got through the initial greylisting and honey pot) is almost zero. One or two messages a week. I have actually now turned off IMF on my Exchange servers.

Why is this being so effective?
The simple reason this is being so effective is that the spammer's list of email addresses will contain a mixture of valid and invalid addresses. As soon as the spammer's server attempts to send an email to a non-valid address that is on my honey pot list, it is blacklisted. Even if that IP address subsequently tries to send to a valid address it will be blocked.
Combined with greylisting, which sends away the initial connection, the even if a legitimate address is used first, the spam doesn't get though. The first attempt is greylisted, then if the list of email addresses contains one of the bogus ones, then it gets blocked. The server attempts to deliver again after greylisting and its connection is blocked.

I also think this is more effective than regular blacklisting because it is in real time and is based on email received by my servers.

I have combined this with an SQL backed database for Vamsoft ORF so that both of my SMTP gateways share the same information, meaning that a blacklisting that is set by one server, is also used by the other.

Finally, I have also combined this with custom NDR text, that points people to a special page on my web site. This page explains what is happening, and other ways to contact me. If required, I can then white list to allow the legitimate messages through and take the spam hit for a short time.

Vamsoft ORF:

Exchange 2007 SP2 Released

Exchange 2007 SP2 has been released at last.
You can download it from here:

The service pack is so large because it is the complete installation files. You can install a new server using this download only.

Release Notes are :

The what is new document is here:

This update required Windows Installer 4.5 which you can download from here: 

If you using Exchange 2007 as part of SBS 2008, then you should take note of this blog posting from the SBS Team:

(Blog post updated to include links to release notes and what is new)

Exchange Database Size and Limits

The database of an Exchange server is something that seems to raise a lot of questions with Exchange administrators. Many of the questions appear to be around the size of the database and its limits.
This article should help to increase the understanding of the database size and limits. I have also touched on the thorny topic of offline defrags.

First some terminology.
Where I mention VERSION, this is Exchange 2000, 2003, and 2007.
Where I mention EDITION, this is Standard or Enterprise. Where I mention Standard edition that also applies to the SBS variant.

Unless stated otherwise, references to Exchange 2003 also apply to Exchange 2000.
To the best of my knowledge at the time of writing, Exchange 2007 references also apply to Exchange 2010. However if I find that is not the case, I will update this article.

This is a background article, it does not tell you how to do anything (just in case you came here via Google expecting to be told how to do X with your database).

Myths of the Exchange Database

There are a lot of myths around the Exchange database size and limits which I hope this article will help to dispel

  • The store will dismount when you hit a physical size of 75gb
  • Adding up the mailboxes listed in ESM should equal the size of the database
  • Regular offline defrags are required.

Then there is the confusion with many administrators that the database doesn't shrink in size, even after the users have deleted lots of data. I will cover that as well.

Exchange Database Basics

Lets start with some basics of the database.

With Exchange 2003, the database is made up of two separate files. An EDB and an STM file. These combined are referred to as a store and come in two flavours - Mailbox and Public Folder.
Mailbox and Public Folder stores can be grouped together in to Storage Groups.

The EDB file should be thought of as the MAPI database and will consist mainly of internal email.
The STM file should be thought of as the SMTP database and will consist mainly of external email.
Email sent by Outlook Express users or other internal non Exchange servers would be considered external email.
However some information from the mail in the STM file is held in the EDB file.

The two files should be treated as one.

Mailbox Store and Storage Group Capacities

With Exchange 2000 and 2003 Standard edition you can have one storage group consisting of one database of each type.
With Exchange 2000 and 2003 Enterprise edition, you can have four storage groups consisting of a maximum of four mailbox stores in each group.
With Exchange 2007 Standard edition you can have up to four storage groups with a single mailbox store  or public folder store in each, or a single Storage Group with four mailbox stores.
With Exchange 2007 Enterprise the  number of Storage Groups goes up to 50.

Database Size

The size of the database is a source of much confusion with newcomers to Exchange.
The simple fact with the PHYSICAL size of the database is that it will never shrink without intervention from the administrator. When content is removed from the database then the Exchange server marks that space as white space, and should use that space first for new content before increasing the physical size of the database.

However in practise, that often does not happen. What you will usually find is that if users are asked to clean out their email, more external email will be removed (spam etc) but more internal email is generated.

Database Limits

The database limits are probably the are that causes the most concern for the Exchange administrators, so lets clear that up to begin with.

Exchange 2000 Standard has a database limit if 16gb, which can be increased to 17gb via a registry hack.
Exchange 2003 Standard RTM and Service Pack 1 is also subject to the same limit.
Exchange 2003 Standard with Service Pack 2 has a soft limit of 18gb, which can be increased to 75gb via a registry change.
Exchange 2007 Standard has a soft limit of 50gb in RTM and 250gb in Service Pack 1 which can be removed/changed with a registry change.

Enterprise edition of all versions have a technically unlimited database size, although if you are picky it is 8TB with Exchange 2000/2003.

If you update Exchange 2003 from Standard edition to Enterprise edition, then the registry setting for the soft limit is not removed, so the database may still dismount when it hit the size stated. You need to remove the key completely for that to stop happening

Soft Limit

Soft limits are basically a way for an administrator to ensure that the database doesn’t get out of control. The Exchange server will react when a soft limit is reached by dismounting the store.

Database Limit Enforcement

The way that the database limit is enforced changed with Exchange 2003 Service Pack 2 and subsequent versions.
With Exchange 2000 and Exchange 2003 RTM and Service Pack 1, the limit was simply the physical size of the two database files combined.
With Exchange 2003 Service Pack 2 and later, the limit is now a logical limit. The limit is the physical size of the two files, minus the white space.

The white space is reported by event ID 1221 during the night.
The logical limit of the database is not reported by Exchange until you change the default limit of 18gb.

The registry keys for increasing the 18gb limit in Exchange 2003 are in Microsoft KB article 912375 (link at the end) however I suggest that you read the Technet Article on how to work with the limit and setting the registry key for the warnings.

When setting the check time, ensure that it is AFTER the maintenance window configured on your Exchange server (ie after event ID 1221 has reported) so that content removed that night is taken in to account.

If you hit the limit -whether it is a limit below 75gb or the maximum 75gb limit and the database dismounts, you can mount it again. However it will dismount again the next day.

Offline and Online Defragmentation of the Database

When it comes to the database size and reducing it, most Exchange administrators will be referred to an offline defrag. However Exchange also does an online defrag. While they are related there are some key differences to what they do. 

The online defrag is part of the nightly maintenance that Exchange does on its databases and is what finds and marks the white space for use. Its results are reported by event ID 1221. If that process does not run, the space gained by deleting content will not be used.

Am offline defrag will take the database and create a new one, consisting of the same data, minus the white space. Therefore the physical size of the database will be reduced. An offline defrag is the only way to reduce the physical size of the database.

The offline defrag is not risk free, and can take a considerable amount of time. The process speed is hardware dependant and can vary between 1 and 4gb per hour. Therefore if you have a 50gb store you could be looking at anything between 12 and 50 hours for the process to complete. Once started, it cannot be stopped. If it is, then both the source and the destination files are useless and a copy will need to be put in place.
The Exchange services have to be stopped while the process runs - so requires total downtime of the server. If you have multiple databases on the server then you can dismount the store you are working on and allow the others to run, however if you are in a position to run multiple databases, then you do not need to do an offline defrag, as I will explain below.

Some Exchange administrators  claim that a regular offline defrag is required to keep the server running at the peak of performance. This is not the case and Microsoft specifically state that an offline defrag should not be considered something that needs to be done regularly.

The reason why there can appear to be a performance gain is because an offline defrag creates a new database. As with many things, if you replace with new then you will see some performance gains. Minor imperfections in the database structure can be removed and things generally cleaned up. However because it will skip data that it cannot read, that can mean there will be data loss.

With Exchange 2007, and Exchange 2003 Service Pack 2, or Exchange Enterprise edition (any version) an offline defrag is not necessary and is a waste of time.

With Exchange 2003 SP2 standard, due to the way that the database is reported, you gain nothing by doing an offline defrag. All you could do is lose data during the process. If you hit the limit, you can remount the database and then remove content.

With Exchange 2007 (all editions) And Exchange Enterprise Edition  (all versions) the process is unnecessary. Simply create another mailbox store, move all of the mailboxes to that store and then drop the original one and delete the database file. You can then create a replacement and move the content back. Zero risk, zero downtime.

If the store you are replacing is the original first store, then it will also hold some system mailboxes. Those will be recreated in another database when the system attendant service is recreated, so you should do that as soon as possible after dropping the original store.

The only reason why you want to do an offline defrag is because you are tight on physical storage, however you will need considerable space to do the offline defrag (At least 110% the size of the store) which will mean additional storage somewhere, so you may as well add it to the original server.

Mailbox Size - Exchange 2000/2003 only.

Many Exchange administrators will be unaware that the list of mailboxes in ESM is not showing the true size of the mailbox. This is clearly shown by the number of questions on forums from administrators who add up the size of their mailboxes and then ask why there is a X gb difference between that total and the sum of their physical database sizes.

In Microsoft KB article number 828070 (link at the end), Microsoft state:

 "When you view the space that a mailbox uses in Exchange System Manager, the amount only includes the space that is used by the Priv.edb file. The amount does not include the space that the Priv.stm file uses."

Therefore a significant difference between the size of the mailboxes and the total of the physical database size should be expected.
This difference is further increased when you take in to account single instance storage and deleted item retention.

Single Instance Storage is a mechanism used within the Exchange database to keep the size of the database down. If you send an email with a 5mb attachment to 10 users, rather than using 50mb of space, it only uses 5mb. The attachment is only removed from the store when the last of those ten recipients removes it from their mailbox.

Deleted Item Retention (aka dumpster) is a feature of the Exchange database, where an item that is deleted from the mailbox or public folder (including removal from the Deleted Items folder) is stored in the database where it can be recovered.


Day to day administration of the Exchange database is not something that most administrators should fear or have any concerns about. As long as you monitor the size of the database regularly, then issues around the size should not come as a surprise.


Exchange Server 2003 mailbox store does not mount when the mailbox store database reaches the 16-GB limit

Database Size Limit Configuration and Management (Exchange 2003 SP2)

How to increase the Exchange Server 2003 Service Pack 2 18-gigabyte database size limit

How to Modify a Database Size Limit (Exchange 2007)

Related Articles

Recover Deleted Items:

Usernames Tried During Authenticated User Attack

Over the weekend one of my clients suffered an authenticated user attack on the SMTP interface of the Exchange 2003 server. This was detected by the monitoring tool I use, HoundDog ( .

The attack was unsuccessful, as I have all of the authentication options disabled.

However what was interesting was the list of usernames that were tried. Some of them are to be expected, but others maybe not so. I have included the list at the end of this posting.

What this list tells you is the usernames that should be avoided, as some of them may well be used as test accounts, with basic or no passwords and therefore may well be easily compromised.
As authenticated user relaying is enabled by default on Exchange 2000 and 2003, if an account can be compromised, even with limited privileges, it can be used to relay spam through your server.

If you do not have anyone using POP3/IMAP accounts on your Exchange server, then authenticated relaying should be disabled completely. It is not required for the correct operation of Exchange with MAPI, Outlook RPC over HTTPS, Outlook Web Access and Windows Mobile or Blackberry use.
If you do have POP3/IMAP users then lock down the authenticated relay to those specific users only. I have added a link to my article on with instructions on how to do that below.

If you are a victim of an authenticated user attack then remember that most of them are not against you or your company directly, but a spammer wanting to use your bandwidth to send their messages, whether this is to sell something or a phishing attack.

Related Articles
Securing the authenticated relaying:
Spam Cleanup:

List of Usernames Targeted During Authenticated User Attack


Successful Exchange 2007 Backup Log Sequence

This is for reference really.
The events below are the sequence for a successful Backup of an Exchange database on Exchange 2007. It should apply no matter what backup application you are using, as long as it is Exchange aware.

When the jobs starts, this is logged:

 Event Type:      Information
 Event Source:      ESE
 Event Category:      Logging/Recovery
 Event ID:      210
 Date:            17/04/2009
 Time:            05:13:25
 User:            N/A
 Computer:      SERVER3
 MSExchangeIS (3680) First Storage Group: A full backup is starting.

Immediately telling you which database is going to be backed up (you would see one for each database).

 Event Type:      Information
 Event Source:      ESE
 Event Category:      Logging/Recovery
 Event ID:      220
 Date:            17/04/2009
 Time:            05:13:25
 User:            N/A
 Computer:      SERVER3
 MSExchangeIS (3680) First Storage Group: Beginning the backup of the file E:\Exchange Databases\First Storage Group\Mailbox Database.edb (size 3206 Mb).

When the backup is complete you get this reference:

 Event Type:      Information
 Event Source:      ESE
 Event Category:      Logging/Recovery
 Event ID:      221
 Date:            17/04/2009
 Time:            05:15:18
 User:            N/A
 Computer:      SERVER3
 MSExchangeIS (3680) First Storage Group: Ending the backup of the file E:\Exchange Databases\First Storage Group\Mailbox Database.edb.

With the database backed up, the logs begin. The Exchange backup will include the logs that were generated while the backup was running. This store is quite small, so only a few log files are required:

 Event Type:      Information
 Event Source:      ESE
 Event Category:      Logging/Recovery
 Event ID:      223
 Date:            17/04/2009
 Time:            05:15:18
 User:            N/A
 Computer:      SERVER3
 MSExchangeIS (3680) First Storage Group: Starting the backup of log files (range D:\Exchange Transaction Logs\First Storage Group\E0000005127.log - D:\Exchange Transaction Logs\First Storage Group\E0000005136.log). 

If the Backup was successful, then the complete message is logged:

 Event Type:      Information
 Event Source:      ESE
 Event Category:      Logging/Recovery
 Event ID:      213
 Date:            17/04/2009
 Time:            05:15:56
 User:            N/A
 Computer:      SERVER3
 MSExchangeIS (3680) First Storage Group: The backup procedure has been successfully completed.

Finally, the committed transaction logs are flushed. You will notice that the last log being flushed is the one immediately before the log backed up earlier in the sequence.

 Event Type:      Information
 Event Source:      ESE BACKUP
 Event Category:      General
 Event ID:      916
 Date:            17/04/2009
 Time:            05:18:16
 User:            N/A
 Computer:      SERVER3

Information Store (3680) Deleting log files D:\Exchange Transaction Logs\First Storage Group\E00000050E1.log to D:\Exchange Transaction Logs\First Storage Group\E0000005126.log.

The backup is successfully completed.